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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
VS. 
JOSEPH GENE CARTER, ( 
Defendant-Appellant. ' 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12467 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Joseph Gene Carter, appeals from the 
conviction of second degree burglary in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. ~ 76-9-3 ( 1953) ente1·ed against him following 
trial by jury in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of second degree burglary 
by a jury, as charged in the information and was sentenced 
to an indeterminate term provided by law to the Utah 
State Prison. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the judgrner 
of the district court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State adopts the appellant's statement of fact 
except as hereinafter set forth. 
The State first called Francis S. Lundell who testifa 
that about December 2nd or 3rd, 1970, he left to visithl 
sister in California and when he returned on DecemberZ! 
1970, he obferved that his horne had been burglariz~ 
Entrance had been gained by breaking through the bacl 
door of his home. Among the items stolen were: a shot 
gun, rifle, Elgin watch, wallet, television, radio, diamom 
rings, cuff links, another wallet, china, electric can opene: 
spotlight, binoculars, outboard motors, electric drilli 
socket sets, and hydraulic jacks. Mr. Lundell also testifia 
that every room roorn of his house had been ransacka 
as well as his outdoor sheds, and someone had attempta 
to pry open the door of his camper (T. 7-10). The onl! 
items recovered from this burglary were the shotgun, rillt 
watch an.d wallet (T. 9). 
Mr. Lundell testified that he did not know the d~ 
fendant, Joseph Gene Carter, and he had never authoriz~ 
hirn to enter his home or to take any of the stolen itelll 
(T. 10). On cross-examination the defense brought o~ 
the belief of Mr. Lundell that more than one person woul1 
have been involved in the burglary to have loaded ili 
er 
:~ 
electric motors and he furtner testified that there were 
different sized shoe tracks in the snow (T. 12-13). 
Ruth Bethers tec;tified that she was engaged to Larry 
Carter, a brnther of the defendant (T. 21), and that E:he 
personally knew Joe Carter (T. 13). Mrs. Bethers testi-
iet fied that on December 2, 1970, the defendant, Joe Carter, 
another brother, Larry Carter and Ike McDonald came to 
her house at about noon. Ike McDonald had two wallets 
1a with him and was removing cards from them. Mrs. Bethers 
bi was unable to identify plaintiff's Exhibit 4 as one of the 
~ wallets, but she did remember one of the wallets was black 
:e: (T.14). While Mrs. Bethers was unable to identify the 
l~ defendant, Joe Carter, as having made any incriminating 
101 statements, she did testifiy that her fiance, Larry Carter, 
Jn' "kept telling them they were crazy." (T. 15). 
1e 
il1 At 5: 45 p.m. the same day, Mrs. Bethers testified that 
the defendant, Joseph Carter, Danny Carter and Ike 
Jff McDonald came to her home and her fiance, Larry Carter, 
l« 
t.old Mrs. Bethers he "didn't want to go with them, but 
W: he had to talk them out of it." The four of them then left. 
ru: At about 6: 30 p.m., the defendant, Danny Carter, Larry 
]1 
C11rter and Ike McDonald returned to her home (T. 16-
17). When they returned, they had a rifle which Larry 
d1 brought into the house. Mrs. Bethers identified plain-
z~ tiff's Exhibit 2 as the rifle brought into her home (T. 18). 
~Ill Mrs. Bethers also testified the next day, just before noon, 
0~ the defendant and Danny Carter, Ike McDonald and two 
cl1 others arrived and stopped in front of her home. At that 
ili time, Larry Carter got the rifle and tool;: it out to the car 
4 
and moments later Archie Thompson pulled up beblm 
them. The next thing she observed was Thompson putt~ 
the gun into his car (T. 19). Mrs. Bethers assisted t~ 
sheriff in getting this rifle back from Thompson (T. 20) 
The next prosecution witness was Bill Bethers wh 
testified that he was in the home of his ex-wife, Rutl 
Bethers, on December 21, 1970. Joe Carter, the defendan1 
and Danny Carter and Ike McDonald were there present 
Ike McDonald had a black wallet and Bethers saw a busi 
ness card that had the name Lundell on it (Tr. 23-24) 
The next witness, William Albert Carter, testified tha1 
on December 22, 1970, he was riding in a car driven b1 
Danny Carter (T. 26). The defendant, Joe Carter, aJI( 
possibly someone else, perhaps Ike McDonald, were ala 
in the car (T. 26). Danny Carter gave the witness a wat.cl 
to hock, and this watch given him was identified as plain 
tiff's Exhibit 3 (T. 25), which was stolen from Franci 
Lundell's home (T. 9). William Albert Carter testifi01 
that there were conversations concerning a house the: 
had broken into and about a couple of items stolen b: 
them, including a drill and hydraulic jacks. At this tilllf 
they drove to the home that had been buglarized to Iool 
for Danny's driver's license, which had been used to opet 
the front door (T. 28-29). The home was described~ 
being "out by Payson" and it had a "truck and boat ani 
some shacks out back." (T. 29). His testimony reveal~ 
that Danny Carter had the wallet identified as plaintff: 
Exhibit 4 in his possession (T. 29), and also the watd 
identified as plaintiff's Exhibit 3. 
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Ill! William Albeit Carter te3tified that Danny's driver's 
~ license was found at the burglarized home after returning 
t~ a second time to look for it (T. 31), and that he later 
0) found out the home in question was Mr. Lundell's (T. 32). 
rh The witness also testified on cross-examination that while 
itl looking for the driver's license they picked up an electric 
nl drill at the home; Joe Carter, the defendant, Ylas present 
nl at the time of this theft (T. 36). 
IS! The final prosecution witness was Utah County 
I) Deputy Sheriff, Mack Holley. He testified that Joe Car-
IBi ter, the defendant, was in the Utah County Jail on Janu-
bi ary 11, 1971 (T. 39). At about 1: 00 p.m., Deputy Holley 
Ii( gave Joe Carter his Miranda rights and then asked him 
~ "if he had been a part of the burglary at Francis Lundell's 
cl place." Joe Carter said, "No" and "didn't want to answer 
m any more questions at that time." (T. 40). Deputy Holley 
:i then ceased all questioning. Approximately three hours 
01 
later that day, after Joe Carter had been taken out of his 
cell and had been visiting with his wife, Deputy Holley 
e: 
asked the defendant if he had told his wife the truth and ~: 
~ asked the jailor to bring Larry Carter and Danny Carter 
Jl out of their cell so Joe could tell them all that he "didn't 
~ do it." After Danny told him "you just as well tell him 
w the truth," Joe admitted he had been a part of the bur-
1~ glary (T. 41). None of this testimony was objected to by 
the defense. 
The prosecution rested and the defense moved to dis-
miss on the grounds of insufficient evidence. This motion 
was denied (T. 50). 
.. 
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The defense called Paddie M. Carter, the wife of fu 
defendant, to testify as a witness. She gave a somewD. 
different account of the date and circumstances leaclinga 
to the admissions of her husband. She testified the dat 
was January 7, 1971, not January 11, and that Deput 
Holley asked a couple of questions as to whether Joew~ 
telling the truth (TT. 51-52). The defendant's wife the 
testified that both she and the defendant agreed to ha1 
Danny and Larry brought out and to have Joe tell ill 
story in front of them. She differs on what was then sair 
claiming that Deputy Holley asked several questions~ 
fore Danny and Larry spoke telling Joe, "Go on, Joe,~ 
them. They have got us all." Mrs. Carter testified thatJ~ 
then said, "I was there." (T. 53). 
Following this testimony the defense rested. The cour 
read the instructions to the jurors and closing argumenl 
were presented. The jury retired to deliberate at 3:0 
p.m., and returned at 3: 33 p.m. (T. 56) and returned: 
guilty verdict (T. 57) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE'S WITNE& 
DEPUTY SHERIFF MACK HOLLEY, WAS ADMISSIBLl 
UNDER THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE, AND NO ERROf 
WAS MADE IN ITS ADMISSSION. FURTHER, THE FAil 
URE TO OBJECT TO ITS ADMISSION WAIVES AN1 
RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT TO APPEAL THIS ISSU! 
A. FAILURE TO OBJECT. 
7 
The defense never objected or excepted to the testi-
mony of Deputy Sheriff, Mack Holley, at any stage of 
the proceeding. Since the defense was aware that Deputy 
Holley would likely testify, they should have moved to 
suppress any allegedly illegally obtained confession and 
failure to so move or to object at trial must be deemed to 
be a knowing waiver. 
The defendant, Joseph Gene Carter, was arraigned 
in the City Court of Provo City, County of Utah, State 
of Utah, on a charge of second degree burglary on Janu-
ary 8, 1971. The City Court at this date appointed Robert 
Sumsion to represent the defendant (R. 3), and the de-
fendant was advised of his right to a preliminary hearing 
(R. 5) at this time. On January 22, 1971, the defendant 
and his attorney were present in court for the defendant's 
preliminary hearing. Among the witnesses for the State 
1 was Deputy Sheriff Mack Holley who was sworn and 
testified for the State (R. 3). Following the preliminary 
hearing, the City Court bound the defendant over for 
trial (R. 8). On January 29, 1971, the defendant with 
counsel appeared in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
and entered a plea of not guilty. The court set trial for 
February 9, 1971 (R. 11). The matter came on for trial 
and at no time before or during trial is there any indication 
that the defendant objected to or moved to suppress the 
testimony of Deputy Sheriff Mack Holley. Since Deputy 
1 
Holley testified at preliminary hearing, it was apparent 
that his testimony would deal with the confession of the 
defendant. Utah law recognizes that the defense must 
8 
move to suppress evidence at the earliest possible fu 
so as to give the trial court an opportunity to fairly evalr 
ate the voluntariness of the confession. State u. Tuttle,! 
U.2d 288, 399 P.2d 580 (1965), cert. denied 382 US 81. 
(1965). 
It is generally conceded that the trial court is un~ 
no affirmative duty to inquire into the validity of a con 
fession or admission unless the defendant objects to if 
admissibility. See Lundberg u. Buckhoe, 389 F.2d 154 (61 
Cir. 1968); Hammonds u. State, 442 P.2d 39 (Alasl 
1968); State u. Davis, 157 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1968); Stai·. 
u. Gray, 432 S.W. 2d 593 (Mo. 1968); State u. Oliva, lo 
N.W.2d 112 (Neb. cert. denied 395 U.S. 925. 
N.W. 2d 112 (Neb. 1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 9~ 
(1969). 
In a case similar to this, the Supreme Court of Alas& ' 
decided that when at trial, counsel deliberately fails !1 
object to the introduction of evidence obtained contrar: 
to the Miranda doctrine, such a bypass precludes th 
defendant from asserting his constitutional claim on ap 
peal. 
". . . In these circumstances we believe tblr 
it is reasonably apparent that appellant's cound 
knew of the requirement of Miranda, but chosefu 
allow appellant's statements to be admitted wh~ 
counsel knew that he could have prevented thet 
admission by objecting. This suggests that coun.ot 
deliberately by-passed the opportunity to keep ~1 
exculpatory statement out of evidence as a part 
of trial strategy, whatever it may have been. Theli 
is a clear intimation of a deliberate design to kno~· 
ID 
ur 
1, 
,1 
11. 
on 
~ 
ingly forego a constitutional claim. Such a deliber-
ate act on the part of counsel amounts to a waiver 
of appellant's right which is binding on appellant. 
[United States v. Armetta, 378 F.2d 658, 661 (2d 
Cir. 1967). Further citations omitted.] We do not 
know of the existence of any 'exceptional circum-
stances' which, if present, could mean that appel-
lant would not be precluded by his counsel's action 
from asserting his constitutional claim." [See 
Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451-452 
(1965)] (Footnotes omitted). Hammonds v. 
State, supra, at 42-43. 
Since there was no objection at trial to the admission 
ai·. of Deputy Holley's testimony the defendant would be 
IQ 
precluded from raising that issue for the first time on 
appeal. Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 U.2d 19, 465 P.2d 343 
I~ 
(1970). But the Utah Court has recognized that even in 
the absence of a proper objection the Court may review 
;& claimed errors if it appears that the interests of justice 
!1 so require. State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936); 
ii: State v. Shad, 24 U.2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970). However, 
~ in this case, no interests of justice would require the 
ap Court to review this claimed error where the defense de-
]JI 
d 
liberately chose not to object to the introduction of the 
evidence, but rather, chose to attack on cross-examination 
the memory and perception of the witness. See (T. 42-48). 
fu B. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS. 
11 The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. 
bl ~ Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) briefly stated its holding 
eli at p. 444 as follows: 
)~' 
-
10 
". . . [T]he prosecution may not use sta11 J m~nts, whether eRculpatory or inculpatory, sterr 
nung from custodial interrogation of the defendan: 
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural saJ1 r 
?"ua~ds_ eff~ctive to secure the privilege aga.inst 1~ 
mcrumnation. By custodial interrogation we mEJ: 
questioning initiated by law enforcement officer. 
after a person has been taken into custody n 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in an ' 
significant way. As for the procedural safeguaru 
to be employed, unless other fully effective mean 
are devised to inform accused persons of their rig~ 
of silence and to assure a continuous opportunit 
to exercise it, the following measures are requir~ 1 
Prior to any questioning, the person must h , 
warned that he has a right to remain silent, thl 
any statement he does make may be used 1 
evidence against him, and that he has a right t 
the presence of an attorney, either retained t 
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuati[ 
of these rights, provided the waiver is made volun 
tarily, knowingly, and intelligently. If, howew 
he indicates in any manner and at any stage oftfr 
process that he wishes to consult with an attomr 
before speaking there can be no questioning. Likf 
wise, if the individual is alone and indicates in all· 
manner that he does not wish to be interrogate: 
the police may not question him. The m~re far 
that he may have answered some questions n 
volunteered some statements on his own does~ 
deprive him of the right to refrain from answe~ 
any further inquiries until he has consulted Wl~ 
an attorney and thereafter consents to be que 
tioned." (Footnotes omitted.) 
Carter seeks to have his conviction reversed u~ 
the grounds that, inter alia, he did not receive an adequat 
11 
Mirarula warning, and that after he indicated he wished 
to have questioning ceased, the police obtained the ad-
mission. The record clearly shows that Carter received 
an adequate Miranda warning (T. 40). As to the conten-
t tion that the admission was received contrary to Miranda, 
1 it is important to note the purpose and intent of the 
Miranda doctrine. 
Miranda was aimed at the evil of incommunicado in-
tenogation, and the purpose of the Miranda warnings 
is to dispel the coercion inherent in police custodial sur-
roundings which result in self-incriminating statements 
being given without full warnings of constitutional rights. 
See Miranda, supra, at 445. see also People u. Smith, 475 
P.2d 627 (Colo. 1970). 
![ The circumstances in which Carter made his admis-
m sion contained none of the evils Miranda attempted to 
·~ meet. 
!fr 
ir Carter had been arrested and was placed in jail. 
~ Deputy Sheriff Mack Holley testified that he advised 
ill' d Carter of his Miranda rights and then asked him if he 
ar had been a part of the burglary at Francis Lundell's place. 
n Carter answered, "No," and he said he did not want to 
00 answer any more questions at that time (T. 39-40). A 
in n~ couple of hours later after Carter had been visiting with 
1~ his wife and was out of his cell, Deputy Holley asked him 
if he had told his wife the truth. He replied that he had. 
~ Deputy Holley then got the jailor to get Larry Carter 
1
at and Danny Carter out of their cell. Deputy Holley in the 
12 
presence of Carter's wife and Danny and Larry C~ 
then said: 
"Okay, Joe, I want you to tell these guys tfu 
you didn't do it." 
Deputy Holley's trial testimony then continued, 
"So we got them all there together and I sait 
'Now! did you do it?' And Danny Carter said, 'J~ 
you Just as well tell him the truth, because n 
knows about it. He has been able to get someu 
the items that were taken.'" 
"And at this point Joe said, 'Okay, okay. ha 
a part of it. I was a part of the burglary.' " (T. 41 
Under these facts it is clear that the evil of incorr 
municado interrogation was not present when Carter ai 
mitted he was part of the burglary and it is equally clea 
that Carter was told prior to his admission of his right! 
remain silent. (Once a party is told of his right to remai 
silent there is no requirement that he be advised each tim 
he is questioned. See State u. Brooks, 107 Ariz. 318, ~ 
P.2d 385 (1971). Thus, the evils Miranda was meant\ 
dispel were not present when Carter admitted his corr 
plicity in the crime. So even if the Court could revie: 
the claimed error there is no reason to overturn the jury 
verdict. 
Further, since the trial court admitted the question~ 
testimony, it must be presumed that the trial court foun 
the admission to have been voluntarily given, State 1 
Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861 (1948). The defendan! 
Carter, has failed to show any involuntariness, or coropi 
13 
sion which would make his admission inadmissible. In 
addition, the testimony of the defense's witness, Paddie 
Carter, indicates that the defendant consented to have 
Danny and Larry Carter present when the defendant told 
his story. Thus, by the defense's own witness, the defend-
ant aclmowledges that he voluntarily consented t.o speak 
(T. 52). Since the defendant consented to give statements 
he is deemed to have waived his Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination and thus, no Miranda viola-
tion could occur. State v. Hughes, 104 Ariz. 535, 456 P.2d 
393 (1969). 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS ADEQUATELY REPRESENT-
ED AT TRIAL AND HIS CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE AS-
SISTANCE OF COUNSEL MUST BE REJECTED. 
The standard generally announced to judge whether 
a convicted felon was denied effective assistance of coun-
sel is whether assistance was so ineffective that it reduced 
the trial to a sham or farce. See State v. Bustamante, 103 
Ariz. 551, 447 P.2d 243 (1968) and People v. Aikens, 74 
Cal. Rptr. 882, 450 P.2d 258 (1969). 
In Alires v. Turner, 22 U.2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969), 
the Court stated: 
"The requirement [of assistance of counsel] is 
not satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appear-
ance in the record by an attorney who manifests 
no real concern about the interests of the accused. 
The entitlement is to the assistance of a competent 
member of the Bar, who shows a willingness to 
14 
identify himself with the interests of the defendar 
and present such defenses as are available to hl 
under the law and consistent with the ethics oft' 
profession." Id. at 243. l 
This "tamlard vms easily met. The record demo: 
strates that the defendant v;J.s ad2q_uately represented! 
an attorney of good standing; the mere fact that the~ 
pellate counsel disagrees with the tactics of trial COUil\ 
is of no concern to this Court and is no ground for holdin 
ineffective assist:mce of coumel. See State v. Lopez,'. 
U.2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969). 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO REQUH1EMENT THAT CLOSING A! 
GUMENTS OF COUNSEL BE REPORTED AND IN TR 
ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC REQUEST AT TRIAL W 
SUCH REPORTING, THE DEFENDANT MAY NOT CLAJl 
ERROR ON APPEAL. 
There was no request made at trial that the clos[ 
arguments of counsel be recorded. It is generally recq 
nized that it is the responsibility of the defense attorn1 
to request that closing arguments be recorded. In PiW 
State, 4-31 P.2d 449 (Oki. Cr. 1967), the Court states: 
"It has long been the rule that defense coWL' 
has the responsibility to request, and such requ~ 
must be made of the court reporter at each ITT 
when he desires to have the closing argument.n 
pcrted. It is defense counsel's pole responsib~ 
h . d " to preserve and protect 1s own recor , . . · 
The defendant does not allegate that any error\\'. 
committed in the closing argument, he only states thatn 
15 
the arguments been :L'ecorde<l he might have discovered 
some error or have been able to demonstrate that the trial 
counsel was ineffective. Such hypothetical assumptions of 
possible error furnish no ground for relief. Where the de-
fendant failed to request the reporting of closing argu-
ments and where he has failed to make it affirmatively 
appear that any of his substantial rights were in any way 
prejudiced by such proceedings not being recorded, he is 
entitled to no relief. State v. Brown, 198 Kan. 473, 426 
P.2d 129 (1967). 
POINT IV 
NO ERROR WAS CO:MMITTED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN ALLOWING 
THE TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM ALBERT CARTER OR IN 
DIRECTING THE ,JURY TO REGARD CERTAIN STIPULA-
TIONS TO BE TRUE. 
After the prosecution had presented their case, the 
defense moved for a dismissal of the charge on the grounds 
that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the neces-
sary allegations to make out a charge of burglary (T. 50). 
'I'he motion was denied. 
There was no error in denying this motion. The de-
fense based this motion upon their view that the State had 
failed to produce evidence showing Carter was a part of 
the burglary. But since the evidence must be viewed in 
the light most consistent with the jury's verdict, it is clear 
that the state met their burden of proof. State v. Seymour, 
18 U.2d 153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966). 
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The defense also objected to the testimony of fr 
State's witness William Albert Carter on the basis tk 
his testimony did not state which persons made the r 
criminatory statements. The witnesses did testify thatfr 
defendant was riding around in the ca.I and the defendar 
was in the presence of persons who made the incriminafa 
statements that they had burglarized a home. Whiletl 
witness, William Albert Carter, was unable to specifict 
state which persons made which sta~ements he did st1; 
that the defendant was present when they (meaningtl 
defendant, Danny Carter, himself, and possibly Ike 11: 
Donald) returned to the burglarized home to get ti 
driver's license of Danny Carter previously left at tl 
scene and while there present they picked up an electr 
drill (T. 35-37). This evidence was relevant and mater~ 
to the question of the defendant's presence at the seer 
of the crime and was properly admitted. 
The objection of the defendant to the stipulatio: 
(T. 48-48) is also without merit. The stipulations co: 
cemed matters dealing with the procuring of evidence Ir 
trial and did not involve any of the elements to prove tl 
defendant's guilt. The fact that the judge instructed il 
jury to consider the stipulations to be true does not comr 
a finding of error, and even if there may have been em 
no prejudice could have resulted from the instructio' 
Since the matters stipulated to were uncontested, H 
jury would have had to have found them to be true, e11 
if not so instructed. See State v. Chavez, 78 N.M. 446,4 
P.2d 411 (1967), People v. Wood, 75 C.A. 2d 246, 170P: 
477 (1946). 
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CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully submits that the lower court's 
;fu decision should b2 affirmed. Carter was given a fair and 
lat impartial trial before a jury. The transcript discloses no 
errors of law requiring a reversal of the verdict. Therefore, t~ 
respondent respectfully submits that the jury verdict and 
tt 
:all conviction in the district court should be affirmed. 
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VERNON B. ROMNEY 
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